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43 
STRICT IN THEORY, LOOPY IN FACT 
Nathaniel Persily*† 
Most Supreme Court-watchers find the decision in LULAC v. Perry no-
table for the ground it breaks concerning Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
and the ground it refuses to break on the topic of partisan gerrymandering. I 
tend to think the Court’s patchwork application of Section 2 to strike down a 
district on vote dilution grounds is not all that dramatic, nor is its resolution 
of the partisan gerrymandering claims all that surprising. The truly unprece-
dented development in the case for me was Justice Scalia’s vote to uphold 
what he considered a racial classification under the Equal Protection Clause, 
but one that survived strict scrutiny. This essay tries to explain why his opin-
ion is important, both in its own right and with respect to its implications for 
how he might consider the upcoming challenges to the newly reauthorized 
Voting Rights Act. 
As an initial matter, though, it should be clear that Scalia’s opinion 
represents a milestone for him. Never before has he concluded that a law 
otherwise violates the Equal Protection Clause, but nevertheless survives 
because it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Previ-
ously, in City of Richmond v. Croson, he had suggested that “[a]t least where 
state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of 
imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a prison race riot, requiring 
temporary segregation of inmates—can justify an exception to the principle 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” Indeed, even 
in the one case he has considered involving segregation of prisoners for their 
own safety, Johnson v. California, he joined Justice Thomas’s opinion, 
which applied a lower standard of review to uphold the practice given the 
deference ordinarily due prison officials. 
To appreciate the significance of the move in his thinking it is important 
to understand the nature of the constitutional challenge Justice Scalia re-
jects. The plaintiffs launched an equal protection challenge to Texas 
Congressional District 25, which strung together counties from Austin to the 
Mexico border and grouped what Justice Kennedy later determined to be 
two “far-flung” culturally distinct Hispanic communities. The plaintiffs’ 
claim drew on the rule established in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, in which 
the Court made clear that a district that was “unexplainable on grounds 
other than race” or “predominantly based on race” triggered strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause and would ordinarily fail. In some of 
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those cases, however, the Court (which usually meant Justice O’Connor or 
Justice Kennedy) had left open the possibility that a racially predominant 
district could pass strict scrutiny if it was narrowly tailored to avoid a Voting 
Rights Act violation. The Court has never issued an opinion finding a dis-
trict that would pass this test, although in King v. State Board of Elections it 
summarily affirmed a lower court decision upholding the infamous Chicago 
ear-muff district as narrowly tailored to avoid a Section 2 violation. 
In creating District 25 the legislature attempted to further the partisan 
goals of the gerrymander while avoiding a violation of the Voting Rights 
Act. Because the plan removed 100,000 Hispanics from District 23 in order 
to shore up the seat for Republican Congressman Henry Bonilla, it therefore 
increased the number of Hispanics in District 25 (Lloyd Doggett’s district) 
to keep the number of majority-minority districts constant in the plan and 
avoid a voting rights violation. (To be precise, Bonilla’s district was major-
ity-minority, just not when evaluated according to citizen voting age 
population.) The district court found that the creation of District 25 offset 
any potential voting rights liability created by District 23, and in any event, 
the predominant motive of the legislature in creating the district was parti-
san, not racial. Chief Justice Roberts’s cogent separate opinion in LULAC 
explains why the district court was right. 
Although the State’s principal argument in the Supreme Court was that 
District 25 was drawn for partisan reasons, Justice Scalia nevertheless found 
the district triggered strict scrutiny. In his mind, “when a legislature inten-
tionally creates a majority-minority district, race is necessarily its 
predominant motivation and strict scrutiny is therefore triggered.” Unlike 
any other district Justice Scalia had previously considered, though, this dis-
trict passed strict scrutiny because it was necessary to avoid liability under 
Section 5. His opinion raises two big questions: (1) why does Justice Scalia 
think compliance with Section 5 represents a compelling state interest, and 
(2) why was District 25 narrowly tailored to serve that interest? 
There are three reasons, it seems, why Justice Scalia believes compli-
ance with Section 5 is a compelling state interest. First, he relies on 
precedent, echoing his opinion in Tennessee v. Lane, in which he suggested 
that for the sake of stare decisis he would relax his review of the strictures 
of congressional power when race was involved. He cites the Court’s deci-
sion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, emphasizing that “[w]e long ago 
upheld the constitutionality of § 5.” Second, although he admits in a foot-
note that no party in these cases raised an as-applied constitutional 
challenge to Section 5 and he assumes its constitutionality, he describes Sec-
tion 5 in almost glowing terms as legislation that uses race “to remedy 
identified past discrimination” and “applies only to jurisdictions with a his-
tory of official discrimination.” Besides the race riot examples, Justice 
Scalia had always clung to the view that narrow race-conscious remedies for 
individual victims of discrimination could be constitutional. Third, he ar-
gues that Section 5 must be a compelling state interest because, if it were 
not, “then a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to 
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choose between compliance with § 5 and compliance with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.” 
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on the precedential importance of the Court’s 
decisions in upholding Section 5 and the historic justification for the statute 
is relevant for how he might consider constitutional challenges to the newly 
reauthorized Voting Rights Act. Although the rationale for continuing cover-
age only of the particular jurisdictions captured by Section 5 is weaker 
today than it was in 1965, perhaps Justice Scalia’s opinion here suggests he 
will look the other way and not apply the kind of strict interpretation sug-
gested by his other opinions considering the scope of Congress’s power 
under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of course, 
given changes to the law made in this reauthorization (e.g., overturning 
Georgia v. Ashcroft and Reno v. Bossier Parish II) he probably will find 
Congress went too far this time or that the coverage formula is no longer 
congruent to the class of jurisdictions with a history of official discrimina-
tion. That being said, his effusive description of Section 5’s purposes and 
precedent is quite remarkable. 
His argument about the forced choice jurisdictions would face if Section 
5 were not a compelling interest, however, goes strongly against the grain of 
his prior opinions. The idea that mere compliance with a federal statute 
somehow immunizes otherwise unconstitutional state action seems a strange 
move for Scalia to make (to put it mildly). Surely, the state’s defense that “it 
was only following orders” or that the “devil (i.e., federal government) made 
me do it” would not allow the state, for instance, to segregate schools or ban 
interracial marriage. Either the antidiscrimination and remedial justifications 
for the state’s construction of this district are compelling or they are not, but 
the federal government’s coercion of the state should not factor into the cal-
culus. Suppose Congress used its Enforcement Clause power to require 
states to set aside ten percent of the spaces in its public universities for mi-
nority applicants or give preferences for minority contractors—would an 
otherwise unconstitutional quota or preference enforced by the state now be 
constitutional? The implication here is that the presence of a federal law 
cures the constitutional defect in the district, and conversely, if the law were 
to expire, such a district would then be unconstitutional. 
The problems with the analysis are compounded by the evaluation of 
whether the district was narrowly tailored to avoid retrogression under Sec-
tion 5. Drawing on the Court’s decision in the later Shaw cases, Justice 
Scalia suggests the Court ought to ask whether there was a “strong basis in 
evidence” for the state to believe the construction of such a district was 
“reasonably necessary” under the Act. He notes that a state has great flexi-
bility to comply with the Act, per Ashcroft, which allows states to choose 
the proper balance of influence districts and majority-minority districts. Be-
cause he reads the appellants as conceding that the creation of another 
majority-minority district was necessary to avoid Section 5 liability, he de-
cides the racially discriminatory district is narrowly tailored. 
From reading this opinion one would think that the State struggled to 
find a way out of the dilemma between a voting rights or constitutional  
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violation and that the contours of District 25 were therefore a necessary evil. 
In fact, the State placed itself in that bind when it decided to improve the 
reelection prospects of a Republican Congressman (Bonilla) instead of 
keeping the district as the federal court had drawn it in 2001. The alleged 
“need” to offset the decline in the Hispanic population of District 23 by cre-
ating a new majority-minority district arose simply because the State was 
unwilling to keep the current lines in place and risk losing a Republican 
seat. District 25 is only “necessary” once the decision is made to protect 
Bonilla’s district; it is only “narrowly tailored” if the State has a compelling 
interest to avoid Section 5 liability while also shoring up an incumbent’s 
electoral prospects. 
Contrast this approach with the stand taken in Justice Thomas’s dissent 
(joined by Scalia) and voiced by Justice Scalia in the oral argument in the 
Michigan Law School affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger. There 
the State made the argument that it had a compelling interest in achieving a 
racially diverse student body while also maintaining an elite and selective 
law school. Affirmative action was necessary under this view, because the 
school could not otherwise maintain its high admission standards and 
achieve a racially diverse student body. As Justice Thomas described the 
goals of the law school’s affirmative action program, “[t]he interest in re-
maining elite and exclusive that the majority thinks so obviously critical 
requires the use of admissions ‘standards’ that, in turn, create the Law 
School’s ‘need’ to discriminate on the basis of race.” He concludes, how-
ever, that “[u]nless each constituent part of this state interest is of pressing 
public necessity, the Law School’s use of race is unconstitutional,” and “the 
Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom aesthetic and 
its exclusionary admissions system—it cannot have it both ways.”  
The situation in LULAC is parallel, but even less justifiable. Whereas the 
decision to have an elite law school required the use of a racial classification 
to achieve racial diversity simultaneously, here the decision to protect an 
incumbent forces the state to impose a racial classification to comply with 
the Voting Rights Act. Even assuming incumbent protection is an interest 
comparable to having an elite law school, leaving the districts as they were 
and risking Bonilla’s seat obviously would have been a more narrowly tai-
lored way of achieving compliance with the Act.  
Furthermore, even if the State wanted to fulfill both goals—incumbent 
protection and Voting Rights Act compliance—it had a multitude of options 
before it that did not give rise to the same Shaw-related concerns present in 
District 25. As Justice Scalia references in his invocation of Ashcroft, the 
State did not need to create an additional majority-minority district to com-
ply with Section 5. After subtracting the 100,000 Hispanics from Henry 
Bonilla’s district, it could have created other more compact influence dis-
tricts, probably without even intentionally doing so on the basis of race. He 
takes shelter under the appellants’ self-serving concession that an additional 
effective Latino district was necessary to comply with Section 5, but we 
know Justice Scalia disagrees with that concession given his position in 
Ashcroft.  
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None of this critique of Justice Scalia’s opinion should be taken as criti-
cizing the ultimate destination he reaches, namely the upholding of the 
Texas gerrymander. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts explains why that might 
be the correct result and reasonable people can disagree about the various 
claims of partisan gerrymandering and voting rights violations. What 
Scalia’s resolution of LULAC shows is that even the most ardent advocate of 
a color-blindness approach to equal protection must bend his principles 
when it comes to redistricting. Racial considerations inevitably play a role 
in the redistricting process, whether or not the Voting Rights Act forces the 
construction of districts of particular racial percentages and whether or not 
the census building blocks of redistricting plans continue to come primarily 
with racial data attached. With the move of each piece of geography from 
one district to another, linedrawers are aware of the race-based implications 
of their decisions. Each move represents the expression of a confluence of 
intentions, decisions, and constraints, one of which is almost always the 
eventual racial composition of districts. The goals of the redistricting proc-
ess are properly the subject of policy, and constitutional, debate. Yet, as 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in LULAC confirms, rigid presumptions against 
race-based intentions derived from other areas of the law will often give way 
to the practical realities of this special type of state action where racial con-
siderations always lurk in the background. 
